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Abstract
We revisit the issue of existence of equilibrium in economies with
indivisible goods and money, in which agents may trade many units
of items. In [5] it was shown that the existence issue is related to dis-
crete convexity. Classes of discrete convexity are characterized by the
unimodularity of the allowable directions of one-dimensional demand
sets.
The class of graphical unimodular system can be put in relation
with a nicely interpretable economic property of utility functions, the
Gross Substitutability property. The question is still open as to what
could be the possible, challenging economic interpretations and rele-
vant examples of demand structures that correspond to other classes
of discrete convexity. We consider here an economy populated with
agents having a taste for complementarity; their utilities are gener-
ated by compounds of specific items grouped in "packages". Simple
package-utilities translate in a straightforward fashion the fact that the
items forming a package are complements. General package-utilities
are obtained as the convolution (or aggregation) of simple package-
utilities. We prove that if the collection of packages of items, that
generates the utilities of agents in the economy, is unimodular then
there exists a competitive equilibrium. Since any unimodular set of
vectors can be implemented as a collection of 0-1 vectors ([3]), we get
examples of demands for each class of discrete convexity.
Keywords: unimodular sets, laminar families, interval collections,
indivisible goods, complementarity.
2
1 Introduction
Economies with indivisible goods may fail to exhibit competitive equilibria.
However, the situation is not hopeless and there are cases in which they do.
We consider here an economy in which there is only one perfectly divisible
good (numeraire or money) and all other goods are indivisible. The most
general existence result is due to Danilov et al. [5]. It states that existence
of a competitive equilibrium revolves around the issue of whether certain
sets namely those formed from all possible demands (and supplies) of agents
are discretely convex. Danilov and Koshevoy [4] characterized the classes of
discrete convexity. It was shown that unimodularity plays an important role
in such a characterization.
A special class of discrete convexity, the class of polymatroidal sets, at-
tracted a great deal of attention in economics for two main reasons. The
first reason is that in all known models investigating the issue of equilibria
in economies with indivisibilities in the literature, demands turn out to be
sets of the class of discrete convexity associated with integral generalized
polymatroids (see [5]). The second reason, related to the first, is that util-
ity functions that generate such kinds of polymatroidal demand sets have an
immediate interpretability in terms of gross substitutability a well known eco-
nomic property. The following classics of the literature on the topic (i.e.Kelso
and Crawford [12], for details see Gul and Stachetti [11], Danilov et al [7],
and Murota [13]) document various aspects of how this property comes into
play in varied set-ups.
We propose here to the reader to understand and interpret unimodularity
in economic terms, namely in terms of complementarity. Suppose a consumer
is interested only in a specific compound A (we shall use the word package)
of items, where A is a subset of the set of available indivisible goods in the
economy. More precisely, suppose his utility function has the form U(x) =
v if x ≥ 1A and = 0 otherwise for some v ≥ 0 (here 1A represents the
characteristic vector of the subset A of the item set). By construction, this
utility function expresses that the items in the package A are complementary.
The demand of a consumer with such preferences is very simple: it reduces
to either A or nothing. We call such utility functions elementary A-package
utility functions.
To generate richer and more interesting demand patterns we can revert
to the aggregation of elementary package functions. Suppose, that we have
a collection, T , of packages formed from the goods available in the economy.
Suppose that the consumer is interested only in packages belonging to that
collection F . In this case, we say that the consumer has a T -package utility
function.
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Theorem 1 gives a necessary (and almost sufficient) existence condition
for a pure exchange economy in which all agents have T -package utilities.
Namely, it states that a competitive equilibrium exists (at any initial endow-
ment) in such an economy if the collection T is unimodular. The collection
T is unimodular when its associated incidence matrix is totally unimodular,
that is as soon as anyone of its minors takes any of the values 0, 1 or −1.
Let us note that any unimodular system can be implemented as a collec-
tion of packages (see [3]). Thus, for any class of discrete convexity, we get
examples of utility functions with demands from that class.
We consider further two classes of unimodular collections. The first class
is that formed by collections of intervals with respect to some ordering of
the set of indivisible goods (Proposition 2). The second is that formed by
collections obtained as the union of two laminar families (Proposition 4). A
family of packages is called laminar if any two members of this family, whose
intersection is not the empty set, are such that either the first is a subset
of the second or vice versa. The corresponding results about equilibria are
formulated in Theorems 2 and 3.
We give generalizations of Theorems 2 and 3. The generalization of
Theorem 2 (Theorem 2′) accounts for more general forms of demand sets,
whereas that of Theorem 3 (Theorem 3′) rests on the fact (see Proposition 6)
that any laminar-package utility function has the complementarity property.
Acknowledgements. V.I. Danilov and G. A.Koshevoy gratefully acknowl-
edge the support of the grant NSh-929.2008.6, School support, the grant
047.011.2004.017 from NWO and RFBR, and the grant 05-01-02805 from
CNRSLa from CNRS and RFBR.
2 A pure exchange model
We consider a pure exchange economy1 with one (perfectly) divisible good
(numéraire or money) and with many indivisible items. Let I represent
this finite set of indivisible goods, each of which can be consumed in any
integer amount. Consider the following set ZI of formal linear combinations∑
i∈I xi[i], where xi are integers. A bundle x consisting of various integer
amounts of items in I can be adequately represented by an element of ZI .
The bundle consisting of one unit of item i is denoted [i]. Finally, ZI+ denotes
the set of bundles containing non-negative xi.
1We confine ourselves to a pure exchange model for reasons of simplicity; production
can be adapted in a fully straightforward manner.
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The utility functions of the consumers (buyers) in this pure exchange
economy are given by monotone functions on “the positive orthant” ZI+.
This implies, in particular, that we focus on preferences that are quasi-linear
with respect to money. Any linear (and monotone) function p : ZI → R
can be considered as a price. Alternatively a price is defined as a function
p : I → R+, where p(i) denotes the price of a unit of good [i].
Given a price p, the demand of a buyer, whose utility function is u :
ZI+ → R, is a bundle of items x ∈ ZI+ from the set defined as follows
D(u, p) = Argmax(u− p).
Suppose we have a set B of buyers (each endowed with a utility function ub)
and a total initial endowment X2. A price p is a (competitive) equilibrium
price of this pure exchange model if
X ∈
∑
b
D(ub, p),
that is if there exist bundles xb ∈ D(ub, p) for all buyers b ∈ B such that∑
b xb = X.
It is convenient to aggregate the utilities of all buyers by performing a
convolution. Let f and g be two functions given on ZI+, then the (supremal)
convolution of these functions, denoted f ∗ g, is a function on ZI+, defined as
(f ∗ g)(x) = max(f(y) + g(z), y, z ∈ ZI+, y + z = x).
The convolution ∗bub of an arbitrary finite family of functions is obtained by
associativity. The following equality between the demand associated to the
aggregate utility and the individual demands holds true
D(∗bub, p) =
∑
b
D(ub, p).
We shall now formulate the general condition for the existence of com-
petitive equilibria in terms of this aggregate utility function U = ∗bub.
Definition. A function f on ZI+ is pseudo-concave if it has a super-
differential at any point X ∈ ZI+.
Recall that a linear function p on ZI is a super-differential of a function
f at a point X if
p− p(X) ≥ f − f(X).
2We may reason in terms of an aggregate endowment, since we assume that preferences
are quasi-linear.
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One can show that a function f defined on ZI+ is pseudo-concave if and only
if it is the restriction on ZI+ of some concave function given on RI+.
Lemma 13. The following statements are equivalent:
1) the aggregate utility function U = ∗bub is pseudo-concave,
2) there exist competitive equilibria for any initial endowment X.
It is immediate to see that 1 implies 2: let p be a super-differential of U
at the point X. Then X ∈ D(U, p) = ∑bD(ub, p). Therefore X = ∑xs,
where xb ∈ D(ub, p) and p is an equilibrium price. The converse is even
easier to prove.¤
In this context, we see that the argument invoked to warrant the existence
of equilibrium in the set-up of indivisible goods economies is very similar
to the argument one would invoke in the case of economies with divisible
goods and concave utilities. One needs only to substitute the word "pseudo-
concave" by the word "concave". In the divisible context, as soon as the
individual utilities functions of all the buyers are concave (they are in RI+),
then so is the aggregate utility. Existence then follows. However in the
indivisible case, the convolution of pseudo-concave functions needs not to
be pseudo-concave. This is, indeed, the main cause for non-existence in the
context of economies with indivisible goods and transferable utilities.
In their study of existence in production economies with indivisible goods
and money, [5] considered a particular sub-class of pseudo-concave functions
(IGP -concave functions) that was closed with respect to convolution. It
turned out that IGP -concave functions were meaningful in terms of prefer-
ences in that they allowed for substitutability between the goods, and what
more, precisely in the sense proposed by Kelso and Crawford [12]. The prop-
erties of this class of utility functions have now been exhaustively described,
see Danilov, Koshevoy and Lang [6], Gul and Stacchetti [11] or else Murota
and Tamura [14]. We proceed to investigate sub-classes of pseudo-concave
functions for other classes of discrete convexity.
3 Package functions and unimodularity property
A package is a non-empty subset of the set I and we shall identify it with
the bundle 1A = [A] =
∑
i∈A[i].
3Actually, this is an alternative formulation of the criterion proposed by Bikhchandani
and Mamer [1].
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Definition. Let A ⊂ I be a package. An elementary A-package function
is a function u : ZI+ → R taking the following form
u(x) = v min(1, xi, i ∈ A) =
{
v, if x ≥ [A]
0, otherwise,
where v is a non-negative real number (‘a reservation value’).
A consumer endowed with an A-package utility views the items from
A as strict complements. As a consequence the consumer derives a utility
amount equal to v out of the consumption of the unitary bundle [A] (or,
for the matter, from any bundle with larger amounts of each item than in
[A]). And consequently, this consumer does not derive any satisfaction from
a bundle in which some item i from A would be missing.
The demand of this consumer is easy to figure out. The consumer de-
mands package [A] as soon as its cost p(A) =
∑
i∈A p(i) is smaller than
v, and demands no package {0} when p(A) > v. In the boundary case
p(A) = v, the consumer’s demand is the set D(u, p) = {0, [A]}. Note that
the consumer might be inclined to demand any amount of an item i, when
the latter’s price is 0.
We now move on to utility functions obtained as convolutions of elemen-
tary package functions. Let T be a collection of packages.
Definition. The function f : ZI+ → R is a T -package function (or is adapted
to T ) if f is the convolution of a family of elementary A-package functions
with A ∈ T .
For example, the function f(x) = ϕ(min(xi, i ∈ I)), where ϕ : Z+ → R+
is a pseudo-concave function of one variable and ϕ(0) = 0, is compatible
with the singleton family {I}. Indeed, it is the convolution of the following
family (vnmin(1, xi), n ∈ Z+) of I-package functions, where vn = ϕ(n+1)−
ϕ(n). Conversely, an elementary I-package function has the form ϕ(min(xi)),
where ϕ(t) = vmin(1, t) for t ≥ 0.
It is clear that if every buyer b, in an economy, is equipped with a utility
function ub adapted to T , then the aggregate utility function U = ∗bub is
adapted to T as well.
Elementary package functions are pseudo-concave. However, taking any
arbitrary collection of packages T , and computing the associated T -package
function, we often enough end-up with a function that is not pseudo-concave.
Hence, in general, a pure exchange economy with T -package preferences will
fail to exhibit equilibria. Here is a simple, but instructive example.
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Example. Consider a pure exchange economy with three consumers a, b, c.
Let I consist of three items, 1, 2 and 3. Now consider the following col-
lection T := {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3)} of elementary packages. Assume that the
consumers are endowed with the three elementary package utility functions:
ua = 2 min(1, x1, x2), ub = 2 min(1, x1, x3) and uc = 2 min(1, x2, x3). Sup-
pose that the initial endowment consists in a unique exemplar of each item,
[1] + [2] + [3]. This economy has no competitive equilibria.
Here is the reason. By symmetry arguments, we may without loss of
generality assume that p(1) = p(2) = p(3) = p. Let us now analyze the
behavior of the aggregate demand in terms of p. If p < 1, then every buyer
requests his/her elementary package; the aggregate demand consists in two
units of each item and this is larger than the initial endowment. If p > 1,
each individual’s demand is equal to 0, and this will not yield an equilibrium
either. Thus the only possible candidate to an equilibrium price is p = 1.
At this price vector, each buyer is indifferent between buying his package or
buying nothing. Computing the aggregate demand for all possible configura-
tions, we easily notice that it never contains the initial endowment. Indeed,
the demand of each buyer is limited to an even number of items: 2 or 0.
Thus the aggregate demand will also consist of an even number of items
and on the other hand the initial endowment encompasses an odd number of
items. Thus there is no price for which the aggregate demand matches the
aggregate endowment.
We now provide a criterion to assess the pseudo-concavity of a T -package
function. This criterion rests upon unimodularity, as follows from [4]. We
associate to any family T the incidence matrix M(T ) = (mi,A), rows corre-
spond to elements of I, whereas columns correspond to sets from T , defined
as follows. For i ∈ I and A ∈ T , mi,A is equal to 1, if i ∈ A, and is equal to
0 otherwise. For instance, in the Example above M looks like this1 1 01 0 1
0 1 1
 .
Definition. A family T is said to be unimodular if the matrix M(T ) is
totally unimodular, that is if its minors take values equal to 0 or ±1.
Note, that the family of packages considered in the preceding Example
is not unimodular, because det(M) = −2. Interested readers can revert to
([16], Chapter 19) to read about totally unimodular matrices.
Proposition 1. Let T be a collection of packages. The following two
assertions are equivalent :
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1) the collection T is unimodular ;
2) T -package functions are pseudo-concave.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Taking Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 together, we obtain the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Let T be a unimodular collection of packages. Suppose that
buyers have utilities, that are compatible with T . Then the economy has
competitive equilibria at any initial endowment.
In [3], it was shown that any unimodular system can be implemented as
a collection of Boolean vectors.
Below we present two examples of unimodular collections. These are,
namely, the collection formed by intervals of goods and that formed by the
union of two laminar families on the set of goods. The first one provides
an implementation of the graphical system with a complete graph. Some
cographical systems can be considered in the framework of the second exam-
ple. For remark that the cographic systems A(G1), A(G3) and A(G4) (see
section 9 in [2]) take the form of the union of two laminar families.
4 Interval packages
4.1 Intervals
Suppose now that the set of goods I is endowed with a linear order. We can
then identify I with the set {1, . . . , n} and thus write Zn+ instead of ZI+. An
interval in I is a subset of the form {i, i+1, . . . , j}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
Let I be the set of all intervals in I. A consumer with I- package preferences,
will value intervals rather than individual items.
Suppose that the indivisible goods are fields, or land areas. Then one
could very well conceive situations in which a buyer might precisely value
the fact that his fields are adjacent one to another. Therefore such a buyer
would not only value the total area of land he possesses, but also the fact
that his fields are connected one to another (see also examples in [15]).
The following Proposition is well known, but we shall give a proof in the
Appendix.
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Proposition 2. The collection I of intervals is unimodular.
Equipped with this first and economically meaningful example of a uni-
modular collection, we can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 2. A pure exchange economy with indivisible goods has compet-
itive equilibria if its buyers are endowed with I-package utilities.
4.2 Interval-concave functions
We present here a generalization of the Theorem 2, based upon the requiring
that utility function satisfy certain properties, and not upon the requiring
that they take a specific functional form. This enlarges the class of interesting
functions with respect to the previously defined "I-package" functions. We
introduce a few new notions in order to define this class,.
Let f be a pseudo-concave function defined on ZI+ and p be a linear
functional. The convex hull coD(f, p) of the set D(f, p) = Argmax(f − p)
is called an affinity domain of f . The affinity domains form a polyhedral
decomposition4 of the positive orthant RI+ as p varies,; this decomposition
is called the parquet of f and the polyhedra coD(f, p) are called cells of the
parquet.
Definition. A function f on ZI+ → R is called I-concave (interval-concave)
if it is pseudo-concave and if every one-dimensional cell of its parquet is
parallel to some vector 1A, where A is an interval in I5.
Remark 1: It is possible to give another (equivalent) definition of I-
concavity called Interval Package Improvement. It is inspired by the Single
Improvement property due to Gul and Stacchetti [11].
A function f is I-concave if and only if it satisfies the property of Interval
Package Improvement, that is if at any point x ∈ ZI+, that is not a maximum
for the function f − p, there exists an interval A in I such that max[(f −
p)(x± 1A)] > (f − p)(x).
The class of I-concave functions has two important properties.
4A polyhedral decomposition is a collection of polyhedra, such that anyone of their faces
belongs to the collection as well and, such that any pair of polyhedra of the collection has
a common separating face if the polyhedra intersect.
5Interestingly, the class of I-concave functions is reverted into the class of polymatroidal
functions provided we make an appropriate unimodular transformation of variables. The
system I is isomorphic to the system An discussed among others in [4].
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Proposition 3. The convolution of I-concave functions yields an I-
concave function.
This derives from the Theorem 2 proved in [4] (see also Theorem 4 in
[5]).
Proposition 4. An I-package functions is I-concave.
Proof. It suffices (according to Proposition 3) to check that an elementary
A-package function is I-concave for any arbitrary interval A. To see this
revert to the description of the demand sets generated by an elementary
A-package function that appears at the beginning of section 3.¤
The following generalization of Theorem 2 is obtained as a corollary to
Proposition 3.
Theorem 2′. A pure exchange economy with indivisible goods for which
all buyers have I-concave utilities has competitive equilibria.
Remark 2. The following three conditions6: Complementarity between
adjacent items (SMa), Neutrality between non-adjacent items (SMb) and
Decreasing marginal utility (DMU) define a large subclass of I-concave func-
tions that differs from the class of I-package functions.
• SMa. For any i and j, such that |i− j| = 1,
f(x) + f(x+ [i] + [j]) ≥ f(x+ [i]) + f(x+ [j]).
This requirement formalizes the idea that adjacent items are comple-
ments. Indeed rephrasing the requirement, SMa, as follows
f(x+ [i] + [j]) − f(x+ [j]) ≥ f(x+ [i]) − f(x)
for i and j = i ± 1, adjacent items, we see that SMa expresses that
the “marginal utility” of item i increases when we add to x one unit of
the adjacent item j,
∆if(x) ≤ ∆if(x+ [j]).
where ∆if represents the difference operator: ∆if(x) = f(x+ [i]) −
f(x) and is the discrete analogue of the partial derivative (at the point
x) in the direction of i.
6Compare with the definition of CC-functions in Section 5.2.
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• SMb. For any i and j, such that |i− j| > 1,
f(x) + f(x+ [i] + [j]) = f(x+ [i]) + f(x+ [j]).
SMb, also conveniently rewritten ∆if(x) = ∆if(x+[j]), requires that
the marginal utility of item i does not change when we add to x one
(or many) unit of non-adjacent items (|i− j| > 1). We can summarize
this requirement by saying: non-adjacent items are mutually neutral.
• DMU. For any i ∈ I
f(x) + f(x+ [i] + [I]) ≤ f(x+ [i]) + f(x+ [I]).
Recombined in this form ∆i f(x) ≥ ∆i f(x+ [I]), the property DMU
states that the marginal utility of any item i decreases as soon as the
“full package” [I] is added to the initial bundle x. Now it also requires
that the marginal utility ∆If with respect to the complete package I
at a bundle x decreases with an increase of this bundle x. For indeed
it means that ∆I f(x) ≥ ∆I f(x′), if x ≤ x′, which amounts to
requiring the “concavity” of f .
Functions taking the form
∑n−1
i=1 φi(xi − xi+1) +
∑n
i=1 ψi(xi), where φi
and ψi are concave functions of one variable, belong to this subclass.
5 Laminar families and complementary-concave func-
tions
5.1 Laminar families
Definition. A family L of packages is laminar (or is a hierarchy or a tree
family) if, for any A,B ∈ L, we have either A ∩B = ∅, or A ⊂ B or B ⊂ A.
The notion of laminar family is discussed in [15] (where it actually ap-
pears under the name of nested system). It is well known that any laminar
family is unimodular, however we can find the following stronger assertion
in [8].
Proposition 5. The union of two laminar families is a unimodular family.
We give a proof of this in the Appendix. Let us stress however that the
union of three laminar families can fail to be unimodular; this was shown in
the Example from Section 3.
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As a consequence we obtain.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the utilities of the buyers of some economy are
adapted to a package family T , obtained as the union of two laminar families.
Then the economy has competitive equilibria.
5.2 Complementary-concave functions
Suppose that the buyers in the economy under study can be divided in
two sub-groups. The buyers belonging to the first sub-group have utility
functions that are compatible with L1 a laminar family, and those of the
second sub-group are compatible with L2 a second laminar family. This
economy has equilibria by Theorem 3.
An interesting feature of functions compatible with a single laminar fam-
ily is that they imply demand complementarity in a similar fashion as ele-
mentary package function do. We present below a class of functions C that
entails demand complementarity, contains all laminar functions and is such
that the convolution of any two functions from C is a pseudo-concave func-
tion. The existence of this class C, enables us to provide a more general
context in which an economy populated with agents that can be divided into
two distinct groups where in each group agents are ‘similar’ with respect to
their intra group preferences exhibits equilibria.
Definition. A function f : ZI+ → R is said to be complementary concave
(or a CC-function) if it satisfies the following two requirements (SM) and
(DMU):
SM. For any i and j, such that i 6= j,
f(x) + f(x+ [i] + [j]) ≥ f(x+ [i]) + f(x+ [j]).
DMU. For any i ∈ I
f(x) + f(x+ [i] + [I]) ≤ f(x+ [i]) + f(x+ [I]).
Note that the notion of CC-function, we propose here, is equivalent to
that of L]-function introduced by [9], see also [13].
The notion of CC-function embodies the idea of complementarity be-
tween items, see the comments to properties SMa and DMU in Section 4.
Note, moreover, that the SM and DMU requirements have important and
interesting implications on the behavior of the agents’ demand sets D(f, p)
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as functions of prices. For instance, assume that the price of the i-eth item
increases (while the prices of all other items remain unchanged), then the
quantities demanded of anyone of the items will decrease (albeit not nec-
essarily strictly). We neither prove this implication here, nor use it, but it
helps acquire a better understanding of what CC-functions and their corre-
sponding demand sets are.
A CC-function is always pseudo-concave and more the convolution of
any two CC-functions is pseudo-concave, see [7].
Theorem 3’. Suppose we have two groups of buyers such that the aggregate
utility function of each group is a CC-function. Then there exist equilibria.
The convolution of CC-functions does not yield a CC-function, in gen-
eral. In the sequel, we provide examples of CC-functions. We also im-
portantly discuss the conditions under which the convolution of two CC-
functions yields a CC-function.
5.3 Properties of CC-functions
The present subsection is devoted to improving our understanding of CC-
functions. In the course of action, we shall also introduce various construc-
tion principles for CC-functions.
Let us start with generalities about the structure of the set of CC-
functions. The set of CC-functions is a convex cone; the finite sum of
CC-functions is a CC-function and the product of a CC-function by a
non-negative real is a CC-function. Moreover any affine function is a CC-
function.
Let J be a subset of I and let f be a CC-function of the variables in
J , then the same function f viewed with respect to variables in I is a CC-
function.
Functions of a single variable. Let f : Z→ R be a function of a single
variable (|I| = 1). Then f is a CC-function if and only if f satisfies DMU,
that is if and only if f exhibits "decreasing increments". This is equivalent
to saying that f is the restriction to Z of some concave function ϕ : R 7→ R.
Thanks to this simple remark, we already dispose of a rather wide class
of separable CC-functions. Let ϕi be a concave function of a single variable,
for i ∈ I, then
f(x) =
∑
i∈I
ϕi (xi)
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is a CC-function.
Note, however, that those items for which the utility function exhibits
separability should be viewed as independent one of another, rather than
complementary one to another. Therefore separable functions are certainly
not the most exciting examples of CC-functions. Nevertheless, they form a
neutral class with respect to the convolution operator, in the sense that if
one takes any CC-function and convolutes it with a separable CC-function,
it will result in a CC-function.
Convolutions of CC-functions. In principle, it is difficult to expect
that the convolution of CC-functions will yield a CC-function. We saw
this happen in the Example of section 3. As we aggregated our agents, we
noticed that the preferences of the resulting "collective" agent started to
exhibit something akin to "substitutability".
Assume, for example, that the first consumer was interested in the pack-
age {1, 2}, whereas the second consumer was interested in the package {2, 3}.
Assume moreover that each buyer viewed the items, he was interested in, as
complementary. As soon as we aggregate these two agents, we notice that
the resulting aggregate agent views 1 and 2 as "substitutes". And, in fact, if
the latter has already put hands on one unit of item 3, it now appears that
he is pretty indifferent between completing his draw with a unit of 1 or a
unit of 2. The aggregation process produces a subtle and complex combi-
nation of complementary and substitution between items, which is typically
responsible of the non-existence problem.
Nevertheless, the CC property is conserved under convolution in a few
specific instances. We present now the few cases (at least to our knowledge)
for which this happens.
The first simple instance for which the CC property is conserved is in
some sense when it is inactive. That is if f and g are CC-functions and if f
and g depend on two subsets non intersecting of items, then the convoluted
function f ∗ g is a CC-function. In this case the convolution operator just
simply reduces to the summation operator.
The second simple instance of CC conservation is in the convolution with
an elementary A-package function (where A is either single-element set or is
equal to I).
Proposition 6. The convolution of any CC-function with an elementary
A-package function is a CC-function if either A is a singleton set or A = I.
Proposition 4 provides a procedure by which one can generate new CC-
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functions.
Corollary. Let A1, ..., Ak be disjoint subsets of I, and let fi be CC-
functions of variables in Ai. Suppose that fI is an elementary I-package
function. Then the convolution fI ∗ f1 ∗ . . . ∗ fk is a CC-function.
Proposition 7. Any function f adapted to a laminar family L is a CC-
function.
Proof. Let L be a laminar family and assume that A1, . . . , Ak, . . . are max-
imal elements of L \ {I}. Maximality implies that the sets Ak are disjoint.
Thus any arbitrary package A from L (and different from I) is contained
exactly in one of the Ak, for the Ak are maximal by construction. Therefore,
we can write f as follows
f = fI ∗ (∗k fk),
where fk = ∗ A ∈L, A⊂Ak fA and fA is a convolution of elementary A-package
functions. This decomposition is performed so as to ensure that each func-
tion fk depends now only on the variables in Ak. The reasoning is by induc-
tion and yields that each function fk is a CC-function. Then applying the
previous Corollary, we conclude that f is a CC-function. ¤
Remark 3. Given that our main focus is on the "indivisibility" of the
goods, we have formulated the definition of a CC-function directly in terms of
indivisible quantities (that is elements of the integer space ZI+). Nevertheless
we can devise perfectly divisible examples of CC-functions, i.e. functions f
of continuous variables xi, for i ∈ I (that is functions on the positive orthant
RI+).
Under the assumption that the function is of class C2, the condition
SM takes the following form ∂2f/∂xi∂xj ≥ 0 for all i 6= j, whereas the
condition IM takes the form (∂/∂x1 + . . . + ∂/∂xn) ∂f/∂xi ≤ 0 for all
i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}. The restriction of a ‘continuous‘ CC-function of that
form to the integer orthant ZI+ yields a ‘discrete’ CC-function (this was
observed in [13]).
For instance, let us consider the following quadratic function:
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
ij
aij xi xj ,
where (aij) is a symmetric matrix. The f is a CC-function if and only if the
following two conditions are met: a) aij ≥ 0 for i 6= j, and b)
∑
h ahi ≤ 0 for
all i = 1, . . . , n.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We saw previously that the demand setD(uA, p),
associated to an elementary A-package function uA, is obtained as the (Min-
kowski) sum of several “segments” - taking either forms {0, [A]} or {0, [i]},
i ∈ I. A function f , compatible with a family T , yields for its part, demand
sets D(f, p), that are obtained as the sum of the demand sets corresponding
to elementary package functions. Therefore they may also be decomposed
as a sum of “segments” of the form {0, [A]}, A ∈ T , or of the form {0, [i]},
i ∈ I. These sums of segments, if viewed as sets, are pseudo-convex when
the family T is unimodular. The proof of this can be found in Theorem 2 of
[4]. A set D ⊂ ZI is pseudo-convex if
D = co(D) ∩ (RI).
It is easy to see thereafter that the pseudo-concavity of all demand sets
D(f, p) is equivalent to the pseudo-concavity of the function f . The converse
to this assertion is proven in [4] as well. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. Let I = {1, ..., n}, and let I be the family of
interval subsets in I. We have to check that any minor of the matrix M(I)
takes the values 0 or ±1. If A is an interval in I and, if J ⊂ I, then the set
A∩ J is an interval in J (endowed with the induced order). We can assume
that the size of these minors is n× n.
Thus, let M be an n × n-matrix, whose columns are formed by the
characteristic vectors 1Ai of some intervals A1, . . . , An in I. We have to
prove that the determinant of M is 0 or ±1.
Suppose first, that [1] does not belong to any of the Ais, i = 1, . . . , n. In
this case, M’s first row consists only of 0s and then its determinant is 0.
Thus let us assume that [1] belongs to some Ai, say [1] ∈ A1. Suppose
on top that A1 has the minimal possible size. If some Ai also contains [1],
then by minimality of A1, we have that A1 ⊂ Ai. Substitute column Ai
by Ai \A1. The determinant remains unchanged, indeed, for we subtracted
the first column from the i-eth. The set Ai \ A1 is also an interval as well.
By doing the same for all intervals containing [1], we end up with a new
“interval” matrix with the same determinant as the initial one and such that
[1] belongs to A1 only.
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Deleting the first row and the first column of that matrix, we obtain a new
“interval” matrix, that has the same determinant but is of size n− 1×n− 1.
By induction, its determinant is either 0 or ±1 and Proposition 2 is proven.
Proof of Proposition 5. The three following simple points below will be
useful.
1. A sub-family of a laminar family is laminar.
2. Let L be a laminar family on a set X and Y ⊂ X. If we replace all
elements A ∈ L by A ∩ Y , we obtain a laminar family on the set Y .
3. Let L be a laminar family and let C be a minimal element in L. Con-
sider the new family L′ consisting of C and all sets of the form A \C,
A ∈ L. Then L′ is laminar as well.
Let us now provide the proof of Proposition 5. We have two laminar
families L and R on a set X, and T = L ∪ R. We form the matrix M(T ).
Recall that the rows of this matrix correspond to elements of X and that
the columns have the form 1A, A ∈ T . (For convenience let us place on the
left those columns corresponding to 1A, where A ∈ L and place on the right,
those columns corresponding to 1A, where A ∈ R.) We have to check that
the minors of this matrix take either of the two values 0 or ±1. Recalling
points 1 and 2 above, we can assume that the matrix M(T ) is square and
check that its determinant equals to 0 or ±1.
Consider the following characteristic number ρ(L) of a family L
ρ(L) =
∑
A∈L
|A| − |
⋃
A∈L
A|.
This number is a non-negative integer, that equals 0 if and only if the family
L consists of non-intersecting sets.
To begin with, let us assume that ρ(L) is strictly positive. This implies
that some elements of L meet and, by laminarity, that one of those elements
is strictly contained in another. Let C be a minimal element of L, that is
strictly contained in another element of L. Let us form the family L′ as in
point 3, then
a. The determinant does not change because by doing this we indeed sub-
tract the column 1C to some (left) columns of our matrix.
b. The family L′ is laminar as well.
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c. The characteristic number ρ(L′) for the new family L′ is strictly inferior
to that associated to the initial family, ρ(L).
Reasoning in an analogous fashion for the right side of the matrix, we
can assume for the sake of the proof, that the laminar families L and R are
non-intersecting.
Consider now an arbitrary row of the matrix M(T ). Three cases are
possible.
First case. The row consists of zeros only. (That is the corresponding element
x belongs to no subset from T .) In this case the determinant of the matrix
equals to 0.
Second case. The row consists of a unique 1. (That is the corresponding
element x belongs to a unique set A from T .) If we delete this row and the
corresponding column 1A from the matrix, we notice that the determinant is
equal (up to a sign) to the determinant of the matrix for the family T ′ = T \A
on the set X \x. Point 1, stated above, implies that laminarity is preserved;
therefore reasoning by induction, the determinant of M(T ) takes one of the
required values.
Third case. Every row meets both the left and the right side of the matrix.
That is every element x ∈ X belongs both to some set from L and to some
set from R. Since the two families L and R do not intersect by assumption,
it must be that both L and R are partitions of the set X. This implies in
particular that the sum of all left columns equals to 1X , as well as the sum
of all right columns. But this means that the rows of the matrix M(T ) are
linearly dependent and thus that its determinant is equal to 0. And this
proves Proposition 5.
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